Американская военная машина. Глубинная политика, глобальная связь ЦРУ с наркотиками и путь в Афганистан - Peter Dale Scott

9. Epstein, Agency of Fear, 83.

10. The New York Times Encyclopedic Almanac, 1972, 29: “As a result of Operation Intercept, the federal attempt to restrict the flow of marijuana from Mexico, heroin sales have jumped among children in New York city, a joint legislative committee is told”; Humberto Fernandez, Heroin (Center City, MN: Hazelden, 1998), 214: “In response to the shortage of marijuana, which was either seized or delayed due to Operation Intercept, an increase in heroin smuggling was noticed in southern California and as far north as San Francisco during this time.” These reports are discounted by Eric C. Schneider, who writes that Operation Intercept “lasted a mere twenty days, not long enough to have an impact on anything except Mexican-American relations” (Smack: Heroin and the American City [Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008], 148). But heroin is such an addictive drug that even a brief introduction to it may have lasting consequences.

11. Epstein, Agency of Fear, 84.

12. BNDD Bulletin, September–October, 1970; quoted in Scott and Marshall, Cocaine Politics, 26.

13. Warren Hinckle and William Turner, Deadly Secrets: The CIA-Mafia War against Castro and the Assassination of JFK (New York: Thunder’s Mouth Press, 1992), 373.

14. Scott and Marshall, Cocaine Politics, 26.

15. When Juan Restoy, one of those arrested, “subsequently broke out of jail and was killed in a shoot-out, Little Havana [in Miami] buzzed with a rumor that he had been set up and executed by a CIA execution squad to prevent his testifying about agency involvement in the narcotics traffic” (Hinckle and Turner, Deadly Secrets, 373).

16. Len Colodny and Tom Schachtman, The Forty Years’ War: The Rise and Fall of the Neocons, from Nixon to Obama (New York: Harper, 2009), 20.

17. New York Times, February 1, 1970; Peter Dale Scott, Paul L. Hoch, and Russell Stetler, The Assassinations: Dallas and Beyond (New York: Random House/Vintage, 1976), 371.

18. Alfred W. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin (Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books/Chicago Review Press, 2003), 341, citing Washington Post, August 6, 1971.

19. Epstein, Agency of Fear, 86–87. At the time, Epstein pointed out, the CIA estimated that Turkey produced only from 3 to 8 percent of the world’s illicit opium. However, “Turkey was assumed to be the most convenient and proximate source for the European heroin wholesalers.”

20. Epstein, Agency of Fear, 86.

21. Epstein, Agency of Fear, 87.

22. Valentine, The Strength of the Pack, 45, summarizing Ludlum’s reading from his own notes of an “implementation” meeting on November 3, 1969.

23. Drugs in Lebanon were channeled largely through the Casino de Liban, where Marcel Paul Francisci was the gambling concessionaire. The casino was controlled by Yousef Beidas through the Bank Intra, which the criminal financier Robert Vesco tried but failed to take over after the death of its owner Yousef Beidas (Arthur Herzog, Vesco: From Wall Street to Castro’s Cuba [New York: Doubleday, 1987], 150). No one has ever satisfactorily explained Vesco’s mysterious connections to Nixon, his nephew Don Nixon, Nixon’s aide Richard Allen, Attorney General John Mitchell, and the CIA. See, e.g., James Rosen, The Strong Man: John Mitchell and the Secrets of Watergate (New York: Doubleday, 2008), 228.

24. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, 381.

25. Jussi Hanhimäki, The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 90; Time, March 9, 1970.

26. Valentine, The Strength of the Pack, 53.

27. Valentine, The Strength of the Pack, 88.

28. Epstein, Agency of Fear, 92, cf. 310–11. Cf. also Valentine, The Strength of the Pack, 46, quoting James Ludlum: Turkish “enforcement was weak, and the whole Turkish program eventually failed.” This foreseeable failure raises the possibility that the $35 million was at least partly with some other goal in mind. Kissinger was simultaneously working out a deal to use Turkey as a third party to evade congressional prohibitions on aid to Pakistan (Hanhimäki, The Flawed Architect, 181). Negotiations with the Turks began in 1970, at a time of political chaos in Turkey resembling that in Paris two years earlier. In this crisis the CIA station chief was Duane (“Dewey”) Clarridge, who worked closely with Counter-Guerrilla (the Turkish version of Gladio), and through Counter-Guerrilla, Martin Lee has associated Clarridge with the “armed bands of Grey Wolves [who] unleashed a wave of bombings and political assassinations that culminated in a coup in [March 1971]. . . . At the same time, members of the Grey Wolves were immersed in the international drug trade” (Martin A. Lee, The Beast Reawakens [Boston: Little, Brown, 1997], 202). Years later Turkish Defense Minister Hasan Esat Isik “harshly criticized the subversion of Turkish sovereignty through the U.S.-sponsored Counter-Guerrilla: ‘The idea came from the United States. The financing as well’” (Daniele Ganser, NATO’s Secret Armies: Operation Gladio and Terrorism in Western Europe [London: Frank Cass, 2005], 233).

29. One of Liddy’s assistants on heroin matters, Gordon Minnick, toured the Golden Triangle and came back (according to Howard Hunt) “with a report that the White House found very disturbing” (E. Howard Hunt deposition, House Select Committee on Assassinations, November 3, 1978, RIF#180-10131-10342, http://www

.aarclibrary.org/publib/jfk/hsca/secclass/pdf/Hunt_11-3-78.pdf, 35).

30. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, 284–85, citing interview with BNDD agent, November 18, 1971.

31. New York Times, June 6, 1971; McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, 288.

32. New York Times, July 8, 1971.

33. For the case of Puttaporn Khramkhruan, see Valentine, The Strength of the Pack, 254–56; David Corn, Blond Ghost: Ted Shackley and the CIA’s Crusades (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), 300.

34. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, 410–14.

35. Egil Krogh, the White House liaison with the BNDD, later went to jail for his role in overseeing the break-in by the so-called White House Plumbers into the office of Daniel Ellsberg’s psychiatrist. Krogh is described by Len Colodny as “a lawyer with a CIA background. . . . Krogh . . . had worked for Ehrlichman’s firm